Can Religious Experience Be a Reasonable Ground for Theism?

Earth's crammed with heaven, 

And every common bush afire with God,

But only he who sees takes off his shoes;

The rest sit round and pluck blackberries.

- Elizabeth Barrett Browning

"Does religious experience provide a rational ground for belief in God?"[1]

The bible gives account after account of people having direct experiences of God. In it's pages, God reveals himself to kings and prophets.  God is shown relating to his creation and revealing himself. The scripture teaches that God endows human beings with the ability to perceive – although imperfectly – religious, and spiritual realities through God given religious experience. It also recognizes that man's ability to know is far from perfect: his initial epistemic perceptions are fallible but functional. Christians in every generation have attested to the immediate presence of God. This raises the question: Can religious experience be an good ground for believing that God exists?

Many would say it is reasonable to think so. Consider our perception of experience in general. We all have a default trust in our perception that things are as they seem.[2] In this way, we understand the perception of our experience as good grounds for believing they are what they seem. Thus, It is rational to treat all our experiences as innocent until proven guilty. So we ought to believe that things are as they seem unless and until we have evidence that they are mistaken. For example If I seem to see a mulberry bush in my backyard. I have good grounds for believing there is a mulberry bush there. So generally stated, how things appear in my experience gives good grounds for believing that the mulberry bush exists. I can rationally assume my experience is innocent until proven guilt. But What if, I had good reason to think that how things appear to me may actually be mistaken. It is reasonable if not necessary for me to pause and critically reflect and look for any counter evidence. What if I remembered that for the past 15 years, I’ve never seen one in my backyard. What if, I did not plan for a mulberry bush to be planted there. What if, even after explaining its location my wife looks and says she does not see a mulberry bush in the backyard. What if my friends agrees with her. What if, I have recently been taken medication and one of its side effects is hallucinations.  After these considerations it is unlikely that I am seeing what I seem to be seeing. The counter evidence calls my perception into question. I have no good grounds for believing an a mulberry bush is in my backyard.

Now Alleged religious experience correspond to perceptual experience in that they both are a type of experience. Thus, it is rational to treat all our experiences including our religious experience as innocent until proven guilty like we do perceptual experience. Thus, religious experience should be approached as prima facie evidence. If I seem to be directly aware of God’s presence, and if there are no overriding reasons why things are not as they seem, then I have good grounds for believing that God is present and hence for believing that God exists (since God would not be present if God did not exist).  In general it seems rational that, for those who have had the experience, belief in God may be grounded in an experience of God.

This begs the question, Would my experience be evidence for others if I tell my experience to them? Is testimony about an experience of God good grounds for believing in God?  Following the above argument, We should assume the experiences of others are likely to be as they report them to be unless good reason to the contrary. Thus the principle is that the testimony of an experience should be trusted unless there is at least as good a reason to think that it is mistaken. For example, If I report to others that I saw a particular mulberry bush, then, in general, recipients of my testimony have good grounds for believing that I saw it and hence that that particular mulberry bush exists. But what if, I have a reputation as a joker or known for telling lies. What if recipients of my testimony have strong independent reasons for denying that there is an mulberry bush (or that mulberry bushes don't do that anymore).

In conclusion, direct religious experience and testimony about such an experience may provide for believing in God (Theism). It should at least provide motivation for exploring more evidence. A credible Christian testimony is more than a testimony, for the unbeliever it is potentially a grounds for belief in God, for the believer it is encountering God as present in the story of another.




Footnotes
[1] I am indebted to Richard Swinburne's defense of religious experience. He draws on the methodological assumptions used by scientist in their research. The principles of credulity, and testimony underlying the modern scientific method are used to great effect. He has argued that when applied to religious experience they reveal such experiences should not be dismissed. In a cumulative way they help form a epistemological ground for belief in God. See Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, (New York: Clarendon Press. 2004). 

[2] This is called the principle of credulity in the philosophy of science, and is a basic assumption for doing research in the sciences. Credulity means the tendency to be too ready to believe something is true. Human perception naturally assumes a measure of credulity. When used in reference to human perception it properly describes the poster we take towards the perception of our experience. See KAI-MAN KWAN, "The Argument from Religious Experience", in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Craig, William Lane and J. P. Moreland (eds). (Blackwell Publishing, 2009)